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How do banking crises affect aggregate consumption? Evidence from 
international crisis episodes 
 
1. Introduction 
In most countries, consumption accounts for more than half of GDP. Normally, it evolves 
smoothly and attracts little policy attention, even though it directly reflects households’ 
living standards and thus is an important measure of wealth.  
Since the financial crisis began in the late summer of 2007, the slump in consumption in 
many economies has moved it into focus. One central question in formulating policies to 
revive consumption is whether something fundamental has changed in households’ 
expenditure patterns or if the decline in consumption represents the normal reaction to an 
unusually large shock.  
One fundamental change that might have occurred is that credit constraints have started to 
bind. The permanent income hypothesis (Friedman, 1957) predicts that consumption should 
mirror an individual’s life-time income. It should evolve over time only as permanent income 
expectations are adjusted. Since actual income is more volatile than permanent income, 
actual income generally displays more variability than consumption. 
However, the literature suggests that the permanent income hypothesis can fail to hold in 
the presence of credit constraints (the first references in this field are Leland, 1968, and 
Tobin and Dolde, 1971). If actual income falls and households have neither accumulated 
savings nor access to credit, their consumption has to adjust downwards. Credit constraints 
thus imply a stronger response to income reductions than in normal times. The dynamics of 
consumption therefore may change during financial crises. 
In this paper, we estimate consumption functions using a quarterly panel dataset of 23 
countries over 32 years. We choose this cross-country approach in order to obtain sufficient 
crisis observations – in any single country, financial crises are too rare and samples too short 
to pin down any special crisis dynamics.  
We report three main findings. First, consumption seems in the long run related to income, 
housing and other financial wealth. This finding is robust in the data if a mean-group 
estimator is used. Standard panel techniques, which impose equality of coefficients across 
countries, do by contrast not yield intuitive long-run relationships. Second, consumption 
growth appears lower during financial crises. Thus, the short-run dynamics seem changed; 
no change in the long-run relationship or in the reaction to disequilibria in it is detected. 
Third, income growth, for which we observe a negative response in the overall sample, 
seems to have a slight positive impact on consumption growth during crises. These two 
latter findings suggest that consumption smoothing is more difficult during crises and can be 
interpreted as evidence of credit constraints. 
3 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. 
Section 3 discusses the data, Section 4 outlines our methodological approach, Section 5 
presents our empirical findings and Section 6 concludes.   
 
2. Literature and background 
There exists an extensive literature on financial crises, considering the causes of such 
episodes e.g. asset price bubbles, high credit growth and current account deficits as well as 
the relative success or impact of containment and resolution strategies (Kaminsky and 
Reinhart, 1999, Summers, 2000, Honohan and Klingebiel, 2003, Barajas et al., 2007, Caprio 
and Honohan, 2008, Laeven and Valencia, 2008 and 2012, and Claessens et al., 2010). 
However, there is less research quantifying the effect of financial crises on economic 
outcomes, especially relating to expenditure aggregates such as consumption and 
investment.  
Of the research that estimates the cost of financial crises, the majority focuses on the net 
output losses as well as the fiscal costs of banking sector resolution strategies. Using a 
sample of 39 systemic crises, Caprio and Honohan (2008) state that average fiscal costs 
amounted to 12.5 percent of GDP with the wider costs estimated at 14.6 percent of GDP on 
average. Hoggarth et al. (2002) find similar output impacts with cumulative losses of roughly 
15-20 percent of GDP. Honohan and Klingebiel (2003) show that the total fiscal outlays from 
financial crisis are highly dependent on the choice of resolution strategy employed. They 
also find no evidence that accommodation measures (such as liquidity support and state 
guarantees) reduce the output losses associated with crises. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) 
provide a summary overview of the aftermath of financial crisis noting that three 
characteristics are often shared by post crisis economies. First, falls in asset prices are deep 
and prolonged, second, output and employment decline significantly and thirdly, the real 
value of government debt tends to increase markedly.  A number of studies find that 
financial crises lead to permanently lower potential output. Cerra and Saxena (2008) use 
panel data for a large set of high-income, emerging market, developing, and transition 
countries, and find robust evidence that the large output loss from financial crises and some 
types of political crises is highly persistent. Barrell et al. (2010) test the effect of financial 
crises on potential output for 13 OECD economies. They find a step down in output per 
worker around crises periods.  
In an emerging market context, Fallon and Lucas (2002) test the effect of financial crises on 
labour markets, household incomes and poverty. They find that aggregate production fell 
considerably more than employment but with much intra-industry heterogeneity. Cuts in 
real wages were strongest in countries with considerable currency depreciation with 
households responding to lower wages by increasing labour force participation and using 
private transfers.  
There are relatively fewer papers that deal with the effect of financial crisis on specific 
macroeconomic expenditure aggregates such as consumption and investment. A number of 
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studies have focused on the linkages between financial shocks and macroeconomic 
aggregates including consumption since the current financial crisis. Hubrich et al. (2013) 
analyse the transmission of financial shocks to the macroeconomies of 36 European and 
OECD economies. Financial shocks are measured through asset prices (stocks market and 
house prices), the term spread, loans to private residents and banks loans-to-deposit ratios. 
Macroeconomic outcomes are GDP growth, consumption and investment. They find 
considerable heterogeneity of macro-financial effects across countries and find that financial 
variables affect investment more than private consumption. Mendoza and Terrones (2012) 
focus on the dynamics of macro-economic aggregates during credit booms. They link credit 
booms to public consumption, private consumption, investment, nontradables output and 
the real exchange rate. However, neither of these studies specifically focuses on 
consumption patterns across a historical panel of financial crises. 1  
Focusing on the effect of financial crises on consumption, to our knowledge, there is only 
one paper which directly deals with this issue. Barrell et al. (2006) estimate the effects of 
banking and currency crisis on aggregate consumption across advanced OECD economies. 
They find that while crises impact consumption through standard income and wealth 
channels, time varying confidence, uncertainty, and credit rationing also play a role. The 
effects are aggravated by high debt-to-income ratios (reflecting household leverage) 
mitigated in countries where higher levels of financial liberalisation ease credit constraints. 
The second body of research that we contribute to relates to the estimation of the 
consumption function in a cross-country panel setting with wealth effects. The main 
literature on consumption follows the life-cycle hypothesis (Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954, 
and Ando and Modigliani, 1963). The majority of macroeconomic studies of consumption 
express the value of contemporaneous consumption as a function of the level of income and 
the wealth available to consumers.2 Typically, it is assumed that these variables are 
cointegrated and have a stable long-run relationship. In the short-run, consumption growth 
is modelled as depending on deviations from the equilibrium and movements in the growth 
rates of income and wealth. 
The existing empirical work on testing for financial wealth effects on consumption is 
extensive and includes both single-country, multi-country and cross-country panel 
evaluations. For the US, Ludvigson and Steindel (1999) establish the presence of a wealth 
                                                                                 
 
1 Dell’Aricca et al. (2008) consider the real effect of banking crises on investment by firms through the 
financing constraints channel and find that sectors that are more dependent on external finance do 
relatively worse during banking crises controlling for bank dependence, recessions and currency crisis. 
Davis and Stone (2004) examine the effect of financial crises on the corporate investment and flow of 
funds. They find that inventory and investment contractions are the main contributors to GDP falls 
and the effect is greater in emerging markets than developed economies.  
2 Some studies, e.g. Aron et al. (2012) also include the real interest rate. We originally tried 
constructing this variable, but found it difficult to construct comparable measures over our broad set 
of countries and years. 
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effect using dynamic OLS. This finding is supported by Poterba (2000) and Davis and 
Palumbo (2001). Lettau and Ludvigson (2004) note that, while permanent changes in wealth 
do affect consumption, most changes in wealth are transitory and are uncorrelated with 
consumption. In a cross-country setting, Byrne and David (2003) test the affect of financial 
wealth on consumption across the G7 countries using a panel approach. They find that 
illiquid wealth plays a bigger role in determining consumption than liquid wealth. Barrell and 
Davis (2007) find a considerable increase in short-run wealth elasticities following financial 
liberalisation across G7 countries.  
While the above studies have solely focused on financial wealth, much research has been 
completed on the existence and magnitude of housing wealth effects, about which there is 
considerable debate. The majority of empirical studies find a small positive effect of housing 
wealth. For instance, Aron et al (2012) estimate a marginal propensity to consume out of 
housing for the US and UK of circa 0.04 to 0.06, which is in line with estimates such as 
Engelhardt (1996). Aron and Muellbauer (2012) investigate wealth channels for South Africa 
and find that housing wealth enters through a collateral channel. On a cross-country basis, 
Ludwig and Slok (2004) use a pooled mean-group estimator across 16 countries to test the 
affect of stock prices and house prices on consumption. They find positive wealth affects in 
both cases. Slacalek (2009) and Carroll et al. (2011) also test for housing and wealth affects 
and estimate a marginal propensity to consume of between 2 and 9 per cent.  
By contrast, Duca et al (2010), Muellbauer (2007) and Buiter (2010) find little support for a 
housing wealth effect. They argue that depending on the degree of capital market 
imperfections, and substitution between purchases of housing and non-housing goods by 
households, the positive wealth effect due to house price increases can be offset by a 
reduced income effect caused by higher housing costs. Given this ambiguity, the existence 
and magnitude of wealth effects is very much an empirical question.  
One final aspect of the debate on consumption and wealth effects relates to the role of 
credit markets for household consumption. The permanent income hypothesis assumes 
perfect capital markets provide the credit for households to smooth consumption. With the 
existence of financial market imperfections/credit constraints, such smoothing may not be 
optimal or at all possible.3 This affect may be even more acute in times of financial crisis 
where financial intermediation is impaired.  
There is an extensive literature in this area, starting with Leland (1968) and Tobin and Dolde 
(1971), and a number of papers are of particular relevance to ours.4 Bacchetta and Gerlach 
(1997) test the role of credit aggregates in driving consumption in the US, UK, Japan, France 
and Canada. They find that credit aggregates have a considerable effect on consumption 
indicating the presence of liquidity constraints. They also find that consumption displays an 
excess sensitivity to income further suggesting access to finance difficulties. Muellbauer 
                                                                                 
 
3 This debate is formalised by Lattimore and Muellbauer (1995)  who provides the theoretical basis for 
both permanent income and credit channels. 
4 Please see Davis (2010) or Slacalek (2009) for a survey of related research.  
6 
(2007) finds that the housing wealth effect only occurs with financial market liberalisation 
which provides a collateral channel in response to information asymmetries between 
borrowers and lenders. He finds that the housing wealth affect is twice as large in the US as 
the UK. Aron et al. (2012) test the impact of credit conditions on consumption in three 
countries individually and find that the credit channel exists and differs over time and across 
countries. Other work in this area by Jappelli and Pagano (1994) and Engelhardt (1996) also 
highlights a role for credit access in reducing the down-payment requirement for households 
in purchasing housing. In terms of testing credit market effects during crises, as noted, 
Barrell et al. (2006) find that consumption declines following crises are mitigated in 
countries with higher levels of financial liberalisation but increased where household 
leverage is higher.  
 
3. Data 
3.1 Defining crises 
We distinguish between banking crises, crises following credit boom and crises following 
house price booms. We draw on the IMF database developed by Laeven and Valencia (2008, 
2012) to identify crises. This database includes all systemic banking, currency, and sovereign 
debt crises during the period 1970–2011. Laeven and Valencia define systemic banking crises 
as those in which the following conditions are met:  
• Significant signs of financial distress in the banking system (as indicated by significant 
bank runs, losses in the banking system, and/or bank liquidations) 
• Significant banking policy intervention measures in response to major losses in the 
banking system. 
Additional data on banking crises are taken from Barrell et al (2006), who construct their 
database using information from Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) and Bordo et al (2001). 
Though there is considerable overlap between the Laeven and Valencia and Barrell et al 
datasets, using a combination does widen our coverage substantially. Barrell et al classify 
banking crises as episodes which “involve bank runs, widespread bank failures and the 
suspension of convertibility of deposits into currency, or significant banking sector problems 
that result in the erosion of most or all of banking system capital.” One potential limitation 
to using the Laeven and Valencia (2012) definitions of banking crises is that a number of 
crises in small open economies are missed if there is a high degree of foreign bank 
ownership and the banking sector losses from credit booms are felt in the country of 
ownership5. However, as our analysis requires quarterly data for a number of 
                                                                                 
 
5 For example no banking crisis is identified in Estonia in 2008 as the banks are majority Nordic owned 
and the losses were capitalised by parent banks in these countries. More detail on housing booms in a 
sample of such countries are presented in Vandenbussche et al (2012).  
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macroeconomic aggregates as well as house and stock prices, we would have been unable to 
include such countries in this analysis. 
In addition to financial crises as defined by the above conditions, we also focus more 
specifically on crises that were preceded by credit booms and housing booms respectively. 
We split out these subgroups of crises to test whether the post-crisis consumption dynamics 
are dependent on the degree of asset price movement prior to the crisis.6 For example, a 
large equity or house price boom in the domestic economy may support consumption pre 
crisis through wealth effects and potentially easier access to credit. If the post-crisis fall in 
asset prices is considerable, then it may be the case that the consumption reaction differs to 
crises which assets prices were not so adversely affected. Extending the analysis to study 
specifically the affect of banking crises after asset price booms is a further addition to 
existing work in this area. 
To identify crises which were accompanied by credit booms, we take the definition from 
Laeven and Valencia (2008, 2012). They define a credit boom as: 
 “three-year pre-crisis average growth in private credit to GDP in excess of 10 percent per 
annum, computed over the period (t-4, t-1] where t denotes the starting year of the banking 
crisis” (p.9, 2008) 
To identify crises preceded by a housing boom, we use a similar definition, namely:  
 “three-year pre-crisis average growth in house prices in excess of 10 percent per annum, 
computed over the period (t-4, t-1] where t denotes the starting year of the banking crisis” 
Coupling these definitions together, the countries and crises included in the analysis are 
outlined in Table 1.  
  
                                                                                 
 
6 While there is, of course, a high degree of correlation between credit booms and housing booms, we 
believe that isolating the housing element provides additional insight and is appropriate when 
estimating the consumption wealth effects following crises. 
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Table 1: Overview of Country Coverage and Crises Years 
Country Coverage Banking Crises Credit Boom Housing Boom 
Australia 1980Q1-2011Q4 1989 - Yes 
Austria 1988Q1-2011Q4 2008- 2011 - - 
Belgium 1995Q1-2011Q4 2008- 2011 Yes Yes 
Canada 1980Q1-2011Q4 1983 - Yes 
Denmark 1996Q1-2011Q4 2008-2011 - Yes 
Finland 1990Q1-2011Q4 1991-1995 Yes - 
France 1980Q1-2011Q4 1994, 2008- 2011 - - 
Germany 1991Q1-2011Q4 2008-2011 - - 
Greece 2000Q1-2011Q4 2008-2011 Yes Yes 
Hong Kong 1999Q1-2011Q4 - - - 
Ireland 1998Q1-2011Q4 2008-2011 Yes Yes 
Italy 1990Q1-2011Q4 1990, 2008-2011 - - 
Japan 1994Q1-2011Q4 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 - - 
Korea 1980Q1-2011Q4 1997, 1998 Yes - 
Netherlands 1987Q1-2011Q4 2008-2011 - - 
New Zealand 1987Q2-2011Q4 - - - 
Norway 1980Q1-2011Q4 1986, 1987, 1988 Yes Yes 
Portugal 1995Q1-2011Q4 2008-2011 - - 
Spain 2000Q1-2011Q4 2008-2011 Yes Yes 
Sweden 1993Q1-2011Q4 1993, 1994, 1995 Yes Yes 
Switzerland 1990Q1-2011Q4 2008-2011 - - 
United 
Kingdom 1988Q1-2011Q4 2007- 2011 Yes Yes 
United States 1980Q1-2011Q4 1984, 1988, 2007-2011 - - 
Source: Data from Laeven and Valencia (2012) and Caprio and Klingebiel (2003). 
 
3.2 Consumption and income 
We use seasonally adjusted data from a number of different sources in our analysis. To 
estimate the aggregate consumption function, quarterly data for consumption are taken 
from the OECD, except the data for Hong Kong, which are taken from the IMF International 
Financial Statistics Database (IFS). Personal disposable income data are taken from Eurostat 
for EEA members, the IMF IFS for Australia, Hong Kong, Korea and Canada and the national 
statistical office for New Zealand.7 Disposable income is adjusted for taxes. We correct 
consumption and income for inflation using consumer price indices and divide by population 
to express our main variables on a per capita basis. CPI inflation is taken from the IMF IFS, 
and annual population data were taken from the United Nations database and linearly 
interpolated to provide quarterly figures as in Ludvig and Slok (2004).  
                                                                                 
 
7 Exact data sources for each variable by country are available on request from the authors.  
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Figures 1 and 2 present the fraction of income spent on consumption for all countries in our 
analysis. Generally, this fraction is very stable over time: in all plots but that for Korea, the 
scale spans only three percentage points. 
  
Figure 1: Percentage of disposable income spent on consumption 
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Note: Areas marked in grey indicate banking crises. In the regression, we control for the effect of 
banking crises, crises after credit booms and crises after house price booms. 
 
In the figures, the periods of banking crises are marked in grey (the regressions below also 
consider crises after credit and house price booms; these are not marked separately in the 
graphs). It can be seen that in many instances, the consumption share of income rose during 
crises. To the extent that income declines during crises, this suggests consumption 
smoothing.  Declines in consumption relative to income, which would suggest binding credit 
constraints, are rare. Only in Korea do we observe a clear drop, and there are slight declines 
after 2007 in Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States.  
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Figure 2: Percentage of disposable income spent on consumption (continued) 
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Note: Areas marked in grey indicate banking crises. In the regression, we control for the effect of 
banking crises, crises after credit booms and crises after house price booms. 
 
3.3 Wealth 
In our baseline regressions, we proxy housing wealth by using national house price data 
from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and supplemented by data from the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas where unavailable through the BIS. This approach is not ideal, 
since housing wealth depends both on house prices and the housing stock. By using price 
indices, we implicitly assume constant quantities, but are able to cover a wide range of 
countries. As a robustness check we use housing wealth data compiled by NISER for a 
smaller set of countries, which accounts for changes in the stock of houses. The broad 
results turn out not to depend on the exact series used.8  
Non-housing wealth (“financial wealth”) is captured in our baseline regressions using stock 
price indices, which are taken from the IMF’s IFS. However, portfolio diversification means 
                                                                                 
 
8 In the NiGEM database 2013, consumption and personal disposable income are in real terms. 
Financial wealth is measured as net wealth in the personal sector and housing wealth is the value of 
the housing stock. See NISER (2013) for more details.   
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that most investors do not only hold domestic assets, but also invest abroad, and our first 
regression in Table 2 below indeed shows no wealth effect from domestic financial wealth. 
We therefore construct a global measure of stock prices.  
This measure of global financial wealth, shown in Figure 3, is the first principal component of 
the logarithm of national stock price indices. It is derived from an analysis based on the 
correlations of the national stock price indices, since these are of different scales. The first 
principal component, computed over the full sample, explains 69.9% of the common 
variation in the national series.9 The global wealth series shown in Figure 3 is adjusted to 
take into account that the data coverage varies between countries. In particular, we adjust 
the country weights obtained from the full sample analysis so that they sum to 100 for each 
year in the sample.10 
 
Figure 3: Measure of global financial wealth (1980Q1 = 100) 
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Note: First principal component (based on correlations) from national stock price indices. 
 
Our robustness check using NISER data uses an alternative financial wealth variable that 
takes international portfolio composition into account. The results are robust to this change 
in data. 
Appendix 1 shows the national data on consumption, income, financial wealth and housing 
wealth. As discussed in Section 4 below, we estimate the consumption function using a 
mean-group estimator, not a panel, because preliminary regressions suggested that a panel 
                                                                                 
 
9 The cumulative explanatory power increases to 91.2% for the second principal component and to 
96.8% for the third. To keep the cointegrating relationship estimated below compact, we concentrate 
on the first component only. 
10 Thus, in 1980Q1, where we only have financial wealth data for Australia, Canada, France, Korea, 
Norway and the United States, the weights of which in the first principal component sum to 1.17, the 
original weight for Australia, which is 0.21, is scaled up to 100*0.21/1.17=17.9. Proceeding in the 
same way for the other five countries, we obtain adjusted weights that sum to 100. When the Dutch 
data become available, in 1987Q1, the weight adjustment is redone. This procedure ensures that the 
global wealth series does not jump each time a new country enters the sample. 
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imposes too much structure on the data. We therefore do not present panel unit root and 
cointegration tests. Instead, we perform this analysis country by country, again in Appendix 
1. The hypothesis of a unit root is not rejected in most cases.  
Country-by-country Johansen tests using a lag length determined by the Schwarz criterion 
and assuming a deterministic trend in the data indicate evidence of no cointegrating 
relationship in the majority of cases (seven times). This may be due to the relatively short 
sample periods available. In those cases where there is a rejection, most frequently it is for 
the hypothesis of no cointegrating relationship (six times). This can be interpreted as 
suggesting the presence of one cointegrating vector, particularly since the hypothesis of at 
most one cointegrating relationship is rejected only twice.11 Finally, since the Schwarz 
information criterion for a VAR consisting of the variables in equation (1) most frequently 
suggests a lag length of one, we use one lag in our regressions below. 
 
3.4 Debt variables 
Given that financial crises by their nature cause considerable difficulties for financial 
intermediation, an interesting aspect that we wish to explore is how credit markets interact 
with consumption decisions during financial crises. To capture these effects, we include a 
number of debt variables that might impact on consumption dynamics. The first of these is 
credit growth. Bacchetta and Gerlach (1998) find that high credit growth seems to raise 
consumption growth. It is possible that during financial crises, subdued credit growth, which 
may result from credit rationing, may have a particularly strong impact on consumption. We 
test for this possible impact of credit constraints by interacting the growth in private sector 
credit with a crisis dummy. Quarterly private sector credit data are taken from the IMF IFS 
database.  
While credit growth as in Bacchetta and Gerlach (1998) may alleviate credit constraints, a 
high level of household leverage might act as a drag on consumption, as noted by Barrell et 
al (2006). We therefore initially examined whether the debt-to-income ratio is particularly 
important during crises. However, this variable was never significant, and we therefore do 
not report the results here. 
Finally, we follow Aron et al (2012), who argue that a high interest-rate burden of debt 
relative to income may depress consumption. This may be particularly true during crises. The 
interest burden is computed as the product of the debt-to-income ratio and the main 
discount rate.12 Concerns about multicollinearity make us use the interest burden ratio only 
in regressions that exclude credit growth.  
                                                                                 
 
11 We reject the hypothesis of at most two cointegrating relationships three times. There is one 
rejection for at most three cointegrating vectors, and four for at most four. 
12 We use the discount rate in this calculation as money market rates, lending rates and longer-term 
rates were unavailable for the broad and varied sample that we use.  
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4. Methodological approach 
4.1 Error-correction formulation 
Following standard treatment in the literature (Ludwig and Slok, 2004; Carroll et al., 2011), 
our empirical strategy assumes that consumption in the long run depends on income and 
wealth as follows: 
  
𝑐𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑦𝑦𝑡 + 𝛽𝑓𝑓𝑤𝑡 + 𝛽ℎℎ𝑤𝑡 +  𝜀𝑡 (1) 
 
where 𝑐𝑡 is the logarithm of per capita aggregate consumption, 𝑦𝑡 the log of personal 
disposable income per capita, 𝑓𝑤𝑡 the log of non-housing financial wealth and ℎ𝑤𝑡 the log of 
housing wealth.  
The permanent income hypothesis would lead us to expect a long-term parameter value for 
the marginal propensity to consume out of income (𝛽𝑦) of close to unity. However, the 
inclusion of wealth variables that also grow over time leads in the literature to estimates of 
𝛽𝑦 that are lower. The marginal propensity to consume out of financial wealth (𝛽𝑓) is 
expected to be positive and significant. Regarding the marginal propensity to consume out 
of housing wealth (𝛽ℎ), there is ambiguity in the literature as noted.  
In the short run, all of the variables in equation (1) may in principle respond to disequilibria 
in the long-run relationship. We account for this by estimating the long-run relationship in a 
first step using fully modified ordinary least squares (and dynamic ordinary least squares as a 
robustness check). This approach allows for a response of all variables. In a second step, we 
concentrate on the short-run response of consumption to disequilibria in the long-run 
relationship and to changes in the other variables.13 We also include the lagged change in 
consumption. Denoting the error-correction term resulting from the long-run relationship by 
𝑒𝑐𝑡−1 = 𝑐𝑡−1 − 𝛽𝑦𝑦𝑡−1 − 𝛽𝑓𝑓𝑤𝑡−1 − 𝛽ℎℎ𝑤𝑡−1, we estimate 
 
∆𝑐𝑡 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝑎 𝑒𝑐𝑡−1 + 𝑏𝑐∆𝑐𝑡−1 + 𝑏𝑦∆𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑏𝑓𝑤∆𝑓𝑤𝑡−1 + 𝑏ℎ𝑤∆ℎ𝑤𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑡         (2) 
 
It should be noted that we lag the changes in the other variables in this equation. We do this 
to account for potential simultaneity. If for instance income also responds to disequilibria, 
including the current change in income would bias our estimates. Ideally, we would include 
the current change in income and instrument it, but the panel considerations discussed next 
make this approach impossible.  
 
                                                                                 
 
13 This approach is also chosen by Kumar and Rao (2012). 
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4.2 Panel considerations 
We use a panel of 23 countries over 32 years to work with a dataset that contains enough 
observations during financial crises to answer the question of whether or not crises change 
consumption dynamics.  
One of the main issues that requires attention in a cross-country panel data setting is how 
much similarity to assume across countries.  We initially estimated our model using a fixed-
effect panel to capture time-invariant country-specific heterogeneity, but it turns out that 
the results obtained from this method are often implausible and sensitive to small changes 
in the specification. This is also the case when using a pooled mean-group estimator as in 
Pesaran et al (1997), which assumes identical long-run coefficients across countries but 
allows short-run dynamics to differ. We therefore impose as few coefficient restrictions 
across countries as possible. We use a mean-group estimator (Swamy, 1971), which allows 
coefficients differ between countries, but assumes that they are drawn from the same 
distribution. 
Allowing for such variation between countries is not standard in the literature on 
consumption panels, where authors typically impose cross-country coefficient restrictions. 
For instance, Barrell et al. (2006) use panel GLS with fixed effects and thus impose common 
coefficients across countries. Ludwig and Slok (2004) use the pooled mean-group estimator 
of Pesaran et al. (1999), which pools long-run relationships between countries, while short-
run dynamics are allowed to vary by country. 
Appendix 2 presents consumption function estimates obtained using a fixed-effects panel 
and a pooled mean-group estimator. It appears that forcing the long-run coefficients across 
countries to be the same leads to estimates that attribute the effect of financial crises to the 
long rather than the short run. Arguably as a result, we obtain coefficients which are not 
intuitive. More disturbingly, we find no response in normal times to disequilibria in the long-
run relationship in the pooled mean-group estimates, and an explosive behaviour of 
consumption growth if the fixed-effect panel approach is chosen. Given those results, we 
prefer the more general mean-group approach. 
 
4.3 The impact of financial crises 
To test whether financial crises depress consumption by more than the crisis-specific drop in 
income would suggest we include a dummy for financial crises, both on its own and 
interacted with all variables capturing the dynamics of consumption. There are four 
hypotheses to test. 
Hypothesis 1: The long-run relationship between consumption, income and wealth 
is unchanged during financial crises. Since crises are by definition temporary, we do 
not expect to see a change here.  
Hypothesis 2: The speed with which deviations from the long-run equilibrium 
disappear decreases during financial crises. If financial disruptions make 
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consumption smoothing more difficult, the adjustment to disequilibria may become 
slower.  
Hypothesis 3: The short-run dynamics of consumption change during financial 
crises. Consumption growth may be generally lower, or it may respond differently to 
income and wealth changes than in normal times. If income growth falls, 
consumption growth might decline by more than normal during the crisis. A similarly 
stronger response is possible for changes in wealth. One particular channel we 
would like to examine regards the housing collateral effect. If house prices decline 
during a crisis, households have less collateral. Thus, a significant impact of housing 
wealth during crisis periods could be seen as evidence of credit constraints. 
Hypothesis 4: Debt dynamics matter more during crises. Low credit growth, which 
we use in the baseline configuration, may depress consumption growth. High debt 
levels and a high interest-rate burden could have the same effect. 
To preview the results presented next, we find evidence for Hypotheses 1 and 3, and the 
main results detected for Hypothesis 3 is a generally lower growth rate of consumption. 
There is some evidence that income growth affects consumption growth differently during 
crises, but no significantly different impact of wealth. We now present these results in detail. 
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1 Results 
We now turn to estimating consumption functions. Based on the single-country 
cointegration tests, we assume one cointegrating vector and include one lag. To take into 
account that consumption, income and wealth may respond to disequilibria in the long-run 
relationship, we first estimate a cointegrating vector alone, without considering the short-
run dynamics, using a fully modified OLS (FMOLS) and a dynamic OLS (DOLS) approach for 
panel data. The long-run relationship established in this way does not assume that only 
consumption responds to disequilibria, but allows all variables to react. We then use the 
residual from this relationship as error-correction term in an evaluation of the short-term 
dynamics of consumption.14  
Table 2 shows the estimates of the long-run relationship  
 
𝑐𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑓𝑓𝑤𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽ℎℎ𝑤𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (3) 
 
                                                                                 
 
14 We also computed short-run responses for income and wealth. It appears that income responds to 
disequilibria in the long-run relationship, while wealth does not. The results are available from the 
authors on request. 
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fitted using a fully modified OLS mean-group estimator. Table 3 shows the dynamic OLS 
estimates. In both estimations, we choose the number of leads and lags optimally using the 
Schwarz criterion.  
We estimate a long-run income elasticity of consumption of 0.69 both using FMOLS and 
DOLS. We clearly reject that this coefficient equals unity, as implied by the permanent 
income hypothesis. However, this finding is common in the literature and due to the 
inclusion of over trending variables. If we only include consumption and income, the income 
elasticity rises to 0.81 using FMOLS and to 0.88 using DOLS. 
There is no significant financial wealth effect if we use domestic stock prices as our proxy for 
financial wealth. The housing wealth effect is estimated to be 0.05 in both panels, but it is 
significant only in the FOMLS approach. This implies that if stock prices increase by one 
percentage point, consumption rises by 0.05 basis points. This effect is close to standard 
estimates in the literature. 
The second column includes our measure of global financial wealth. We find this to be 
significant with the expected positive sign, suggesting a wealth effect also from non-housing 
assets. Since the principal components approach used to compute this measure of global 
wealth involves normalisations at different stages, it is difficult to interpret the size of this 
coefficient.  
In the third column, we drop domestic financial wealth and interact the other variables with 
the banking crisis dummy. Significant coefficient estimates would suggest that the long-run 
relationship between consumption and the other variables changes in times of crisis. 
However, none of the interactions are significant, suggesting that Hypothesis 1 is not 
rejected. In what follows, we therefore use the same long-term relationship between 
consumption, income, global financial wealth and housing wealth both for crisis and non-
crisis times. The estimates of this relationship are given in the last column of Tables 2 and 3. 
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Table 2: Long-run relationship (fully modified OLS estimates) 
Variable Baseline 
Two types of 
wealth Banking crises Reduced model 
Long-run coefficients 
Income 0.693*** 0.693*** 0.693*** 0.661*** 
Domestic financial 
wealth 
0.003 -0.008   
Global financial 
wealth 
 6.04 x10-4** 7.45 x10-4*** 5.04x10-4*** 
Housing wealth 0.048*** 0.075*** 0.012 0.043*** 
Additional long-run effects during banking crises 
Banking crisis   -1.511  
Income   -0.207  
Global financial 
wealth 
  0.002  
Housing wealth   0.720  
Note: Mean-group estimates of equation (3), using an unbalanced panel of 1841 observations with 23 cross-
sections, covering 1981Q2 to 2011Q4, choosing the number of leads and lags in the dynamic OLS procedure using 
the Schwarz criterion. 
 
Table 3: Long-run relationship (dynamic OLS estimates) 
Long-run coefficients 
Income 0.694*** 0.723*** 0.713*** 0.682*** 
Domestic financial 
wealth 
0.006 -0.003   
Global financial 
wealth 
 5.26 x10-4* 5.35 x10-4*** 4.98 x10-4** 
Housing wealth 0.046 0.060*** -1.41 x10-4 0.038** 
Additional long-run effects during banking crises 
Banking crisis   -1.859  
Income   0.071  
Global financial 
wealth 
  1.09 x10-4  
Housing wealth   0.031  
Note: Mean-group estimates of equation (3), using an unbalanced panel of 1841 observations with 23 cross-
sections, covering 1981Q2 to 2011Q4, choosing the number of leads and lags in the dynamic OLS procedure using 
the Schwarz criterion. 
 
From this long-term relationship, we construct an error-correction term, 𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡 = 𝜀𝑖𝑡, that 
captures the deviations of consumption from the long-run equilibrium.15 In what follows, we 
concentrate on the FMOLS specification. However, the results are very similar if we use an 
                                                                                 
 
15 If we use the crisis dummy for credit or house price booms, we also do not identify a long-run 
impact on consumption. The error-correction term constructed from Table 2 thus is appropriate for 
all three cases. 
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error-correction term constructed from the DOLS estimates instead (the two series have a 
correlation of 0.99). 
To estimate the short-run adjustments to disequilibria, we augment equation (2) by 
including lagged credit growth to capture potential credit market disruptions. We also 
interact all variables with a dummy variable capturing banking crisis, to assess if there are 
changed dynamics during those times. Thus, we fit  
 
∆𝑐𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 + 𝑎 𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝐵∆𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑏𝑐 + 𝑎𝑏𝑐𝑏𝑐 × 𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝐵𝑏𝑐𝑏𝑐 × ∆𝑋𝑖𝑡−1  + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 (4) 
 
where ∆𝑋𝑖𝑡 = [∆𝑐𝑖𝑡     ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡     ∆𝑓𝑤𝑖𝑡∗     ∆ℎ𝑤𝑖𝑡  ∆𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡  ] and 𝑏𝑐 is the dummy variable for 
banking crises.   
Table 4 shows the results obtained using a mean-group estimator. The first column presents 
the unrestricted estimation. It can be seen that consumption growth seems to respond to 
disequilibria in the long-run relationship. Thus, if consumption last period was high relative 
to income and wealth, it grows more slowly next period. Consumption growth tends to be 
lower if it was high the previous quarter, and if income growth was high. By contrast, higher 
wealth growth seems to raise consumption growth the following quarter.  
It is worthwhile dwelling on the negative sign on income growth. In normal times, if income 
growth was high in one quarter, consumption growth does not only not respond, which 
would be optimal if short-run movements in income were seen as temporary, but it seems 
to decrease. This is somewhat puzzling. One potential interpretation is cautious behaviour 
on part of households, perhaps fed by the idea that periods of high growth tend to be 
followed by declines. If households are concerned about credit constraints arising during 
downturns, accumulating buffer-stock savings (see e.g. Deaton, 1991, and Carroll, 1992) is 
an optimal response. 
Turning to the question of whether or not consumption evolves differently during banking 
crises, the findings in the first column suggest no change. In the second column, we have 
shrunk the system by successively dropping the most insignificant variable. We do not find a 
significant coefficient on the interaction between the error-correction term and the crisis 
dummy. This means that we reject Hypothesis 2.  
We do find that consumption growth tends to be lower than normal during banking crises, 
as evidenced by the significant crisis dummy. This can be taken as evidence in favour of 
Hypothesis 3. Moreover, while lagged income growth seems to have a negative impact on 
consumption growth in normal times, the sign reverses. Compared with normal times, 
consumption growth thus moves with income growth during banking crises. While this may 
suggest the emergence of credit constraints, this effect is not strong: a formal Wald test 
does not reject the hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients on income growth in the 
normal case and during crises equals zero (p-value of 0.24).  
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Finally, as regards Hypothesis 4, there is no evidence of a changed role of credit growth 
during crises in Table 4. 
The last two columns replace credit growth with our measure of interest-rate burden. In 
contrast to credit growth, this variable is significant (though it does not seem to have any 
additional impact during crisis times). We find that consumption growth tends to be low in 
countries with a high interest-rate burden. Using this specification, we identify only a 
significant impact of the dummy during crisis times.  
 
Table 4: Consumption function estimates controlling for banking crises 
 Unrestricted 
(using credit 
growth) 
Restricted 
(using credit 
growth) 
Unrestricted 
(using interest-
rate burden) 
Restricted 
(using 
interest-rate 
burden)  
Short-run coefficients 
Constant -0.143 -0.069 -0.088 -0.052 
𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 -0.082*** -0.070*** -0.115*** -0.097*** 
∆𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 -0.207*** -0.171*** -0.222*** -0.182*** 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 -0.034* -0.040* -0.053*** -0.043** 
∆𝑓𝑤𝑖𝑡−1
∗  6.8x10-4* 0.001*** 0.000 0.001*** 
∆ℎ𝑤𝑖𝑡−1 0.060** 0.078*** 0.054** 0.050** 
∆𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 0.014    
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡−1   -0.054** -0.042* 
Additional short-run effects during banking crises 
Banking crisis 1.172 -0.005*** 1.301 -0.005*** 
𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 -0.043  0.025  
∆𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 0.040  0.188  
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 -0.246 0.096* -0.288  
∆𝑓𝑤𝑖𝑡−1
∗  0.001  0.002  
∆ℎ𝑤𝑖𝑡−1 0.270  0.005  
∆𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 -0.029  -0.591  
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡−1   -0.088  
Note: Mean-group estimates of equation (4), using an unbalanced panel of 1732 (1833 if interest-rate burden is 
used) observations with 23 cross-sections, covering 1981Q1 to 2011Q4. 
 
Tables 5 and 6 present results that concentrate on crises that follow credit and house price 
booms, respectively. We find very similar patterns: the short-run coefficients suggest no role 
for credit growth but a significant reduction in consumption growth in response to a high 
interest-rate burden. During crises, consumption growth is lower, and income growth has a 
significant positive impact on consumption growth.16 It is notable that the impact of the 
                                                                                 
 
16 In Table 5, in the regression using credit growth, income growth does not appear to impact on 
consumption growth during normal times, so that the significant positive coefficient estimate for 
crisis periods is unambiguous. If we use the interest burden, income growth has a significant negative 
sign during normal times and a significant negative sign during crises. The Wald test for the sum of 
 
 
20 
crisis dummy is largest for banking crises, followed by crises after credit booms and crises 
after house price booms. This may indicate that households’ ability to smooth consumption 
is most affected if the banking system is in difficulties. 
 
Table 5: Consumption function estimates controlling for credit boom crises 
 Unrestricted 
(using credit 
growth) 
Restricted 
(using credit 
growth) 
Unrestricted 
(using interest-
rate burden) 
Restricted 
(using 
interest-rate 
burden) 
Short-run coefficients 
Constant -0.102 -0.030 -0.489 -0.022 
𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 -0.071*** -0.060*** -0.101*** -0.099*** 
∆𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 -0.189*** -0.203*** -0.199*** -0.182*** 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 -0.028  -0.047*** -0.050** 
∆𝑓𝑤𝑖𝑡−1
∗  0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001*** 
∆ℎ𝑤𝑖𝑡−1 0.074*** 0.076*** 0.054** 0.062*** 
∆𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 0.001    
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡−1   -0.049** -0.043* 
Additional short-run effects during credit crises 
Credit crisis 1.154 -0.004*** 0.958 -0.003** 
𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 -0.065  -0.012  
∆𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 0.105  0.103  
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 -0.245 0.061* -0.289 0.076* 
∆𝑓𝑤𝑖𝑡−1
∗  0.001  0.002  
∆ℎ𝑤𝑖𝑡−1 0.202  0.134  
∆𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 -0.015    
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡−1   -0.554  
Note: Mean-group estimates of equation (4), using an unbalanced panel of 1732 (1833 if interest-rate burden is 
used) observations with 23 cross-sections, covering 1981Q1 to 2011Q4. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
 
these two coefficients equalling zero yields a p-value of 0.50. In Table 6, the same test yields a p-value 
of 0.28. 
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Table 6: Consumption function estimates controlling for housing boom crises 
 Unrestricted 
(using credit 
growth) 
Restricted 
(using credit 
growth) 
Unrestricted 
(using interest-
rate burden) 
Restricted 
(using 
interest-rate 
burden) 
Short-run coefficients 
Constant -0.119 -0.035 -0.060 -0.024 
𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 -0.077*** -0.058*** -0.102*** -0.097*** 
∆𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 -0.189*** -0.188*** -0.199*** -0.175*** 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 -0.022  -0.043** -0.050** 
∆𝑓𝑤𝑖𝑡−1
∗  0.001** 0.001*** 0.001* 0.001*** 
∆ℎ𝑤𝑖𝑡−1 0.070*** 0.076*** 0.051** 0.062*** 
∆𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 -2.6x10
-4    
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡−1   -0.045** -0.038* 
Additional short-run effects during housing crises 
Housing crisis 0.142 -0.003** 0.443 -0.003*** 
𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 0.094*  0.076  
∆𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 -0.128  0.145  
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 0.040  0.073 0.129* 
∆𝑓𝑤𝑖𝑡−1
∗  -2.2x10-5  -0.000  
∆ℎ𝑤𝑖𝑡−1 0.019  -0.207  
∆𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡−1 0.058    
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡−1   -0.031  
Note: Mean-group estimates of equation (4), using an unbalanced panel of 1732 (1833 if interest-rate burden is 
used) observations with 23 cross-sections, covering 1981Q1 to 2011Q4. 
 
5.2 Robustness checks 
This section presents three robustness checks. The first considers the role of house 
ownership. It is possible that the house prices have a larger effect on consumption in 
economies with high ownership rates, and we test if our findings are robust to taking this 
into account. The second robustness check addresses the problem that we proxied housing 
wealth using house prices and financial wealth using stock price indices and uses alternative 
data available for a smaller set of countries. The third robustness check examines the 
possibility that our binary crisis indicator may not capture the severity or duration of each 
episode well enough. 
Table 7 presents consumption function estimates in which we have multiplied the housing 
variable by the ownership rate in each country.17 This means that we attach less weight to 
housing wealth in economies with low ownership. The table reports the restricted estimates 
for the three types of crises. 
                                                                                 
 
17 These data are taken from the European Mortgage Federation, the Swiss Bundesamt für 
Wohnungswesen and, for the remaining countries, which are Australia, Denmark, Japan, Korea and 
New Zealnd, Wikipedia. 
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We again find the largest impact for the banking crisis dummy, while the impact of crises 
after credit booms and after house price booms now seems equally large. There again is a 
sign reversal for income growth. However, and also as before, we do not reject that the sum 
of the two coefficients on income growth equals zero (p-values of 0.40, 0.63 and 0.32, 
respectively). It thus appears that controlling for house ownership does not change our main 
findings. 
 
Table 7: Controlling for house ownership 
Long-run coefficients (fully modified OLS estimates) 
Income 0.654*** 
Financial wealth 5.8 x10-4*** 
Housing wealth 4.1x10-4* 
 Banking crises Credit crises Housing crises 
Short-run coefficients 
Constant -0.042 -0.014 -0.017 
𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 -0.110*** -0.106*** -0.104*** 
∆𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 -0.132*** -0.157*** -0.149*** 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 -0.069*** -0.061*** -0.059*** 
∆𝑓𝑤𝑖𝑡−1  0.001*** 0.0001*** 
∆ℎ𝑤𝑖𝑡−1  0.001* 0.001*** 0.001*** 
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡−1 -0.059* -0.046* -0.041* 
Additional short-run effects during crises 
Crisis -0.005*** -0.003** -0.003*** 
𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡−1    
∆𝑐𝑖𝑡−1    
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 0.101** 0.080* 0.134* 
∆𝑓𝑤𝑖𝑡−1    
∆ℎ𝑤𝑖𝑡−1     
Note: Restricted mean-group estimates of equation (4), but excluding credit growth, using an unbalanced panel 
of 1061 observations with 14 cross-sections, covering 1981Q1 to 2012Q3. 
 
Turning to alternative wealth data, we present in Table 8 consumption function estimates 
based on wealth data from NISER that take quantities and portfolio composition properly 
into account. The drawback of these data is that they are available for only 14, rather than 
23 countries.18 Moreover, we drop credit growth from the regression, since it is available 
only for three of our countries in the NiGEM database.  We use the same starting year as 
before, 1981, and include all available data, which in some cases run until 2012Q3. The table 
presents the restricted estimates, obtained by successively dropping the most insignificant 
variable. 
                                                                                 
 
18 The countries include from the NiGEM dataset are: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Spain, UK, US. 
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As before, income, financial and housing wealth appear to matter for consumption in the 
long run. In the short-run, there is adjustment to disequilibria in the long-run relation, and a 
clear impact of changes in housing and non-housing wealth. We only find consumption 
growth to be lower during credit crises; banking crises and crises after house price booms do 
not appear to have a significant impact. This may be due to the smaller size of the data set 
used in Table 8, which by construction contains fewer crisis episodes. 
 
Table 8: Using NISER data 
Long-run coefficients (fully modified OLS estimates) 
Income 0.840*** 
Financial wealth 0.028*** 
Housing wealth 0.062*** 
 Banking crises Credit crises Housing crises 
Short-run coefficients 
Constant 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 
𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 -0.055** -0.060* -0.055** 
∆𝑐𝑖𝑡−1    
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−1    
∆𝑓𝑤𝑖𝑡−1 0.029*** 0.047*** 0.029*** 
∆ℎ𝑤𝑖𝑡−1  0.092***  0.092*** 
Additional short-run effects during crises 
Crisis  -0.001*  
𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡−1    
∆𝑐𝑖𝑡−1    
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−1    
∆𝑓𝑤𝑖𝑡−1    
∆ℎ𝑤𝑖𝑡−1     
Note: Mean-group estimates of equation (4), but excluding credit growth, using an unbalanced panel of 1061 
observations with 14 cross-sections, covering 1981Q1 to 2012Q3. 
 
We now turn to our last concern, namely that our binary indicator for a crisis may not 
appropriately capture the severity or duration of each episode. Since it is possible that 
consumption dynamics during crises depend on the crisis severity and duration, our model 
may not provide enough insight into crisis-specific effects. Moreover, credit constraints 
might matter more during the recovery than in the actual crisis.  
To try and evaluate whether or not these concerns are valid, we compute for each country 
the mean residual during crises and the mean residual in the first three years after the end 
of each crisis. These are presented in Figure 4.19 There does not appear to be any systematic 
increase in the residuals in post-crisis periods. This suggests that our main model does not 
                                                                                 
 
19 It should be noted that the residuals presented in Figure 4 do not include data on the 2007 crisis, 
which was still ongoing in many countries when our data end. 
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neglect any important effect, as might for instance arise from credit constraints, during the 
recovery phase after financial crises.  
 
 
Figure 4: Mean values of squared residuals for crisis and post-crisis periods 
 
 
Note: Based on residuals of the main system presented in Table 4. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper uses a panel of 23 countries of 32 years to examine aggregate consumption 
behaviour during financial crises. We find that consumption growth is lower during banking 
crises and crises following credit and house price booms. There is some evidence that 
income growth has a stronger impact on consumption in the short run during crises. This 
may represent credit constraints. Credit growth itself is not found to matter, while a high 
interest-rate burden of debt depresses consumption growth both in normal and crisis times. 
In the long run, the evidence supports the notion that consumption evolves in line with 
income and financial wealth. These results are robust as long as a mean-group estimator is 
chosen. Standard panel techniques, which enforce equal coefficients across countries, seem 
too restrictive and yield counterintuitive results. 
Overall, it appears that financial crises reduce consumption growth temporarily. The 
dynamic response of consumption to wealth appears unchanged, while income tends to 
matter slightly more. This suggests a weak role of credit constraints, while in non-crisis 
periods households successfully smooth consumption. To the extent that consumption 
declines during crises, this seems due to the unusually large size of the shock, rather than to 
changed consumption dynamics. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Country results 
This appendix first presents the data by country (Figure A1 and A2). Table A1 presents unit 
roots tests by country, tests for the optimal lag length and results from Johansen 
cointegration tests. The results of these are discussed in the main text.  
 
Figure A1: Consumption and income, real and per capita (first observation = 100) 
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Figure A2: Domestic financial wealth and housing wealth,  
first observation normalised to 100 
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Note: Domestic financial wealth as proxied by the domestic stock market index, housing wealth as proxied by the 
national house price index. 
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Table A1: Individual country tests 
 
Unit root tests (augmented Dickey Fuller 
test, p-value on null of a unit root) 
Lag 
length 
Johansen test 
Rejected number 
of hypothesised 
cointegrating 
relations 
 
Consumption Income Financial wealth 
Housing 
wealth 
SIC 
criterion 
Trace 
statistic/maximum 
eigenvalue 
Australia 0.938 0.989 0.522 0.920 1 No rejection 
Austria 0.729 0.469 0.107 0.408 2 One 
Belgium 0.543 0.514 0.135 0.870 1 No rejection 
Canada 0.984 0.934 0.591 0.928 2 No rejection 
Denmark 0.544 0.518 0.063 0.243 2 No rejection 
Finland 0.994 0.915 0.446 0.691 1 One 
France 0.518 0.558 0.478 0.794 2 One 
Germany 0.805 0.724 0.222 0.954 1 No rejection 
Greece 0.151 0.284 0.402 0.358 1 None 
Hong Kong 0.942 0.646 0.245 0.872 1 None 
Ireland 0.034 0.292 0.583 0.366 1 One 
Italy 0.132 0.567 0.482 0.105 2 No rejection 
Japan 0.046 0.021 0.111 0.890 1 One 
Korea 0.319 0.020 0.300 0.530 2 Three 
Netherlands 0.197 0.486 0.417 0.425 1 None 
New 
Zealand 
0.896 0.910 0.725 0.834 2 None 
Norway 0.975 0.992 0.724 0.922 2 No rejection 
Portugal 0.068 0.021 0.301 0.042 1 Three 
Spain 0.348 0.588 0.388 0.003 1 Three 
Sweden 0.406 0.261 0.131 0.596 1 No rejection 
Switzerland 0.994 0.867 0.423 0.231 1 Two 
United 
Kingdom 
0.654 0.562 0.254 0.878 1 Three 
United 
States 
0.135 0.464 0.522 0.149 2 None 
Note: Johansen tests with lags determined by the Schwarz criterion, assuming a deterministic trend in 
the data. 
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Appendix 2: Alternative panel estimation methods 
Table A2 compares the consumption function estimates obtained under different panel 
assumptions. We show in the first column the output obtained using the mean-group 
estimator, reported in the main text. As mentioned there, allowing for cross-country 
differences in the coefficients seems important. The second column shows the output 
enforcing equal coefficients throughout, the last column the pooled mean-group estimator 
proposed by Pesaran et al (1999), which assumes equal coefficients only in the long run.  
It should be noted that the pooled mean-group estimator does not allow the estimation of 
two long-run relationships in standard econometric packages. We therefore cannot establish 
under this procedure if the long-run relationship between consumption, income and wealth 
is different in crisis times and if there is a different response to disequilibria. For the mean-
group and the standard panel regressions, we are able to estimate a separate long-run 
relationship during crisis times and a separate adjustment coefficient. 
 
Table A2: Alternative estimation methods 
 Mean-group 
estimator 
Panel estimator, 
fixed effects 
Pooled mean-group 
estimator 
Long-run coefficients 
𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 0.661** 1.170*** 
𝑓𝑤𝑖𝑡−1
∗  5.04x10-4***  
ℎ𝑤𝑖𝑡−1 0.043*** -0.157*** 
Additional long-run effects during banking crises 
Banking crisis  0.505*** 
𝑦𝑖𝑡−1  -0.009*** 
𝑓𝑤𝑖𝑡−1
∗   -0.003*** 
ℎ𝑤𝑖𝑡−1   
Short-run coefficients 
Constant -0.069 -0.097***  -0.083*** 
𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 -0.070*** 0.045*  
∆𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 -0.171*** -0.368*** -0.202*** 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 -0.040*  -0.053** 
∆𝑓𝑤𝑖𝑡−1
∗  0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
∆ℎ𝑤𝑖𝑡−1 0.078*** 0.093*** 0.061*** 
∆𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡−1  0.015** 0.038** 
Additional short-run effects during banking crises 
Banking crisis -0.005*** -0.005***  
𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡−1  -0.100*** -0.057*** 
∆𝑐𝑖𝑡−1  0.434***  
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 0.096*  0.132* 
∆𝑓𝑤𝑖𝑡−1
∗     
∆ℎ𝑤𝑖𝑡−1   0.171*** 
∆𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡−1  -0.063*** -0.135** 
Note: Estimates of equation (4), using an unbalanced panel of 1732 observations with 23 cross-sections, covering 
1981Q1 to 2011Q4. 
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The results obtained from a fixed-effect panel generally seem implausible. The income 
elasticity of consumption is estimated to be larger than unity, there is no long-run impact of 
wealth, and the adjustment coefficient of consumption to disequilibria is extremely small. 
Enforcing identical parameters across countries thus seems to impose too much structure. 
The pooled mean-group estimator yields results similar to those obtained from the standard 
mean-group estimator. Again, we do not find a long-run impact of housing wealth, which 
stands in contrast to the system estimates presented in the main text. Also again, this single-
equation approach finds a role for house prices during financial crises, which is not detected 
in the more general system approach. 
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